Stress – A Workers' Compensation Injury? – Maybe

April 23, 2002

Stress in the workplace is nothing new, nor are the side effects such as hypertension, chest pain, anxiety and other nervous disorders which often flow from a stressful, high-paced environment. Some employers recognize stress as a normal and acceptable part of the workday and others view it as indicative of a corporate culture in need of change. Regardless of the employer’s outlook, few employers realize that an environment which is perceived to be stressful by an employee may lead to the filing of a workers’ compensation claim petition.

In the workers’ compensation arena, psychological problems are classified in three distinct categories. The first situation arises where a psychological stimulus causes a physical injury (also known as a mental/physical claim) which limits an employee’s ability to work. An employee alleging a mental/physical claim must prove that stress induced physical ailments not only disable the employee, but are caused by a psychological stimulus at the workplace. The reverse situation occurs when a physical work-related injury causes an employee to exhibit some psychological or nervous injury which impedes his or her ability to work (physical/mental). As with the mental/physical scenario, an employee suffering a mental injury from a physical stimulus need only prove that the physical stimulus caused the mental injury. A third category occurs when an employee is exposed to a psychological stimulus which results in a psychological, not physical, disorder (mental/mental). To establish a mental/mental claim, the employee must not only show causation but must also prove that he or she was subjected to abnormal working conditions while employed. A mental/mental claim presents a much higher standard for an employee to meet.

The number of workers’ compensation claims filed alleging disability due to stress during the workday is on the rise. Consider the following recent situations.

For the past 20 years, employee Jean Whiteside worked for Borroughs Corporation. Borroughs, however, merged with Unisys resulting in a change in Ms. Whiteside’s job duties which increased her overall workload. Among the changes implemented were requirements that she attend meetings which she allegedly could not understand, train her new boss and learn a new computer system while continuing to meet deadlines. As a result of her new duties, Ms. Whiteside alleged that she suffered considerable stress resulting in chest pain, severe diarrhea, loss of appetite and loss of sleep. Two medical experts testified that the severity of her symptoms prevented her from performing her job. The court found that Ms. Whiteside was subjected to a psychological stimulus which caused significant physical injury (mental/physical) and awarded workers’ compensation benefits. See Whiteside v. W.C.A.B., 650 A.2d 1202 (Pa. Commw. 1994).
In contrast, employee Gary Kissinger worked as a truck driver for five years. In March 1992, believing that his union rights were violated when a co-worker received a run for which Mr. Kissinger was eligible, Mr. Kissinger filed a grievance. Mr. Kissinger believed that the employer threatened his job as a result of the grievance. In March 1993, the employer incorrectly accused Mr. Kissinger of damaging the roof of a truck. Again in May 1993, the employer incorrectly identified Mr. Kissinger as the driver involved in an accident and notified him that disciplinary action might follow. In the winter of 1993, during an ice storm, the police requested that Mr. Kissinger and other drivers park their trucks on the side of the road. Mr. Kissinger followed these orders and remained in his truck for over 27 hours and was unable to rest for 41 hours. The employer provided food to and relieved other stranded drivers prior to assisting Mr. Kissinger. In April 1994, a deer ran into Mr. Kissinger’s truck. When Mr. Kissinger reported the incident, he believed that the employer’s representative was “smart” with him. In June 1994, Mr. Kissinger sought medical treatment alleging loss of sleep, high blood pressure, hypertension and chest pains. The court found that only Mr. Kissinger’s anxiety and adjustment disorders, and not his physical complaints of high blood pressure and chest pain, disabled him from working. The court noted that Mr. Kissinger’s medical expert testified that even if Mr. Kissinger’s physical complaints were under control, he still could not return to work because of his psychological problems. Accordingly, the court classified the action as a mental/mental case and denied workers’ compensation benefits since Mr. Kissinger did not establish abnormal working conditions. See Carolina Freight Carriers v. W.C.A.B., 1999 WL 9937 (Pa. Commw. 1999).

Clearly the results in Whiteside and Carolina Freight hinged on the psychological standard which the court applied—either mental/mental or mental/physical. By requiring a showing of abnormal working conditions, the mental/mental standard raises the bar which an employee must reach to establish a work related injury. What makes Carolina Freight noteworthy is the court’s willingness to apply the mental/mental standard to an employee whose psychological disorder did manifest itself as physical complaints. Given this decision, it appears that where physical complaints do not disable the employee from working but, rather, the employee’s mental condition results in his or her disability, then the courts will apply the more stringent mental/mental standard instead of the mental/physical standard. Considering that it is unlikely that stress will be eliminated from the workplace, Carolina Freight at least provides employers with ammunition to combat a workers’ compensation claim based on a psychological stimulus.

For more information, please contact vfaeth@cohenlaw.com or alavelle@cohenlaw.com.